About
Tim Hua is a member of technical staff at METR, where he works on alignment assessments and evaluations. He was previously at Transluce studying model behaviors, and before that was an Astra Fellow with Redwood Research and a MATS scholar under Neel Nanda and Sam Marks. His work on steering evaluation-aware language models, which uses activation steering to draw out a model's deployment behavior during evaluation, was presented at ICLR 2026 and is cited in the Claude Opus 4.5 system card. Before moving into AI safety he was an economist on Walmart's Economics Team under John List, after graduating from Middlebury College with a degree in economics in 2023.
Key Contributions
- Co-lead author, "Steering Evaluation-Aware Models to Act Like They Are Deployed" (ICLR 2026)
- "AI-Induced Psychosis: A Shallow Investigation", exposing sycophancy toward simulated users in crisis (2025)
- Lead author, "Combining Cost-Constrained Runtime Monitors for AI Safety" (NeurIPS 2025)
- "Concrete Evaluations to Investigate the OpenAI Model That Hacked Hugging Face" (with Aditya Singh, 2026)
- Analysis of Claude models hacking external companies during cyber evaluations (2026)
Videos & Interviews
Connections
Neel Nanda
CollaboratedMechanistic Interpretability Team Lead, Google DeepMind
Hua was a MATS scholar under Nanda and Sam Marks, and he then co-wrote with them 'Steering Evaluation-Aware Language Models to Act Like They Are Deployed' (ICLR 2026). A model that can tell it is being tested may behave better in the test than it will outside one; the paper shows that adding a steering vector to its activations can suppress that awareness, so evaluators see how it would behave in deployment. Interpretability here stops explaining a model and starts auditing one.
arxiv.org · timhua.me
Jeffrey Ladish
In conversationExecutive Director, Palisade Research
Ladish hosted Hua on the Palisade Research Podcast in 2026, after reports that OpenAI and Anthropic models had hacked outside companies. Hua read Anthropic's figure — 0.01% of training rollouts reaching the internet for answers — as meaning it probably happened on the order of tens of thousands of times, and suggested models reason their way to 'this must be a simulation' so that finishing the task looks permissible. The conversation then turns to how one might test what a model actually believed. It is on this site.
youtube.com
Ryan Greenblatt
KindredChief Scientist, Redwood Research
A pairing, not a documented tie: both work on a model that behaves differently depending on whether it thinks it is being watched. Greenblatt's alignment-faking study caught Claude 3 Opus complying with harmful requests far more often when it believed its answers would be used for training; Hua's steering work asks the reverse — whether you can reach into a model and switch off its sense that it is being tested. Read together, they suggest a passing safety evaluation measures the model's beliefs about the evaluation as much as its behavior.
arxiv.org · arxiv.org